This article is an opinion piece by Dr. Miklós Radványi, senior executive vice president of the Frontiers of Freedom institute and former congressional chief counsel.
Magyar változat: Magyarország 36 évnyi teljes gerinctelensége a politikai korrupcióval szemben
Hungary did not become corrupt overnight. Nor can the country’s present corruption crisis be attributed to a single government, a single political party, or a single prime minister. Although Viktor Orban’s Gangsterocracy perfected, centralized and institutionalized a gigantic degree of corruption, the foundations of Hungary’s present predicament were laid much earlier. The cataclysmal truth is that, in reality, every Hungarian government since the collapse of Communism bears some responsibility for one of the gravest failures of the relentlessly ongoing political shit-peddling: the failure to establish the principle that public office is a public trust and that the theft or misuse of public property will be punished regardless of political affiliation.
Hungary was supposed to change its political system in 1989-1990. However, it has never accomplished a real transformation of its political system and its corresponding political culture. That distinction does matter. Originally, the Czech Republic chose rupture. Hungary chose accommodation. In 1991, the then Czechoslovakia adopted its famous Lustration Law. Its political message was unambiguous: A democratic state has the right to protect its institutions from networks created to serve a dictatorship. The legislative purpose was not revenge. It was institutional hygiene. The Czech approach reflected an understanding that political democracy cannot simply be declared on election day. Institutions must be rebuilt, personnel must be scrutinized, archives must be opened, conflicts of interest must be exposed, and citizens must be given confidence that the machinery of the old dictatorship has not simply changed its stationery.
Hungary followed a fundamentally more duplicitous course. As a result, it developed a political culture of continuity without accountability. Networks survived. Connections survived. Informal influence survived. Most importantly, the antediluvian feudalistic belief that the state is something that could be controlled by politically connected groups survived. The actors partially changed. The original sin of the Hungarian missed transition was reconciliation with the total absence of accountability. The Jozsef Antall government inherited the extremely difficult task of transforming a Communist dictatorship into a constitutional democracy. They failed abysmally because they were tied to the old regime personally and absolutely lacked any professionalism concerning governing. They were incompetent amateurs. The Gyula Horn government tried to restore the old dictatorship. The first Viktor Orban-led coalition government was burdened by all the shortcomings of the two previous governments. The Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gordon Bajnai governments were equally redundant. When Viktor Orban returned to power in 2010 with an extraordinary parliamentary majority, he quickly took full advantage of the total lack of political and economic safeguards against the corruption of the not even fledgling “democracy.”
By 2025, Hungary ranked last of all the countries that emerged from Soviet occupation. Hungary’s despicable “political elite” failed the country and its people because they all promoted alternating political impunity. Today, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament described the lack of political will to tackle extremely high-level corruption in Hungary as “deeply disturbing” and called for stronger independent anti-corruption institutions and transparent public procurement.
Sensing the overwhelming hostility of most Hungarians to the boundless corruption of Viktor Orban’s Gangsterocracy, Peter Magyar had during his campaign pledged the restoration of public trust. Now, approximately 100 days after being elected with a larger supermajority than any Viktor Orban government before, the TISZA Party dominated Parliament elected Dr. Anna Roza Unger to head the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (Hungarian acronyms: NVVH). Her election was extremely controversial. Ms. Unger is a political scientist. She has no legal background at all. Her main opponent Dr. Miklos Ligeti, has been the Legal Director of Amnesty International Hungary since 2012, working almost exclusively on anti-corruption cases against the Viktor Orban Gangsterocracy. It appears that again personal connections overrode qualification and feudalistic mentality beat merit-based selection.
Peter Magyar is in serious political trouble. His statements following the August 28, 2026, election are both aggressively defensive and questionably argumentative. He acknowledged that Miklos Ligeti would also have been equally suitable, but he failed to give the reasons why Anna Roza Unger was ultimately supported by his party. In this light, his defense that the selection process was transparent is not true. Most strikingly, Peter Magyar argued that Parliament effectively faced a binary decision: it approved Anna Unger in order to avoid jeopardizing the establishment of the entire office. He added that if Parliament failed to elect her, the NVVH’s operation might have been taken off the agenda “perhaps forever.” In connection with this highly ambiguous justification, he confirmed that he imposed parliamentary discipline on the decision. His justification is troublesome for four reasons.
First, his language was prohibitively combative. A Prime Minister establishing an institution whose credibility depends upon political neutrality should respond differently. He must publish the evidence. He must explain the selection criteria. He must release the scoring methodology. He must prove why Anna Unger prevailed. Clearly, the worn-out declaration “trust us – we selected the right person” will not suffice.
Second, the “vote for Anna Unger or possibly lose the institution forever” argument was outrightly stupid. This comes dangerously close to the Communist and Orbanesque dictum of presenting Parliament with a fait accompli. The logic becomes: Anna Unger may not be everyone’s preferred candidate, but rejecting her might destroy the entire project; therefore vote for Anna Unger. This is dictatorial political pressure rather than institutional persuasion.
Third, parliamentary discipline deserves scrutiny. The entire purpose of the NVVH is presumably to investigate sensitive corruption – including potentially individuals associated with previous governments, powerful economic interests, and perhaps even people connected with the present governing coalition. It has never been designed to be a “Research Institution” that seeks evidence for three or six years. The NVVH is construed to investigate, indicate, and punish guilty individuals.
Fourth, and this may ultimately be the most important issue, Peter Magyar must tolerate criticism from his own supporters. He should be very careful. Not every critic is an enemy. Not every uncomfortable question is sabotage. These are the mentalities of the pre-1990s’ Communists. Moreover, not every disagreement with the government represents an attempt to undermine anti-corruption efforts.
Finally, Peter Magyar’s largest test concerns his conception of power. Viktor Orban’s fundamental institutional sin was not merely his boundless corruption. It was the gradual identification of his government, party, state, and nation with one another. Peter Magyar has promised something radically different. Therefore, he must accept a higher standard than Viktor Orban – not merely a different political orientation. His response to the NVVH controversy would have been much stronger had he said, in substance:
“You have every right to question this appointment. Here are the criteria, here are the scores, here is the process, and here are the institutional safeguards guaranteeing that neither I nor my government can interfere with Anna Unger’s investigations.”
That would have demonstrated the political culture Hungary desperately needs: not “trust the new government,” but “build institutions that make trust in government unnecessary.”
